Volume 58

Issue 4

Article 3

9-1-2013

A New Global Initiative on Contract Law in Uncitral: Right Project,
Right Forum?
Keith Loken

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Keith Loken, A New Global Initiative on Contract Law in Uncitral: Right Project, Right Forum?, 58 Vill. L.
Rev. 509 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss4/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR403.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

23-JUL-13

11:33

Loken: A New Global Initiative on Contract Law in Uncitral: Right Projec

2013]
A NEW GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON CONTRACT LAW IN UNCITRAL:
RIGHT PROJECT, RIGHT FORUM?
KEITH LOKEN*
I. IS

A

NEW GLOBAL INITIATIVE NEEDED

AND

FEASIBLE?

A

T its 45th meeting last summer, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) considered a proposal for possible future work in the area of international contract law.1 The proponents suggested that there is an urgent need for a new “global initiative” in
UNCITRAL to further harmonize contract law in order to significantly
boost international trade. Although the chair of the Commission ultimately ruled that there was a prevailing view in the room in support of
further exploratory work in this area, the response among participating
states was quite mixed. A number of delegations—including that of the
United States—expressed strong reservations about undertaking such a
project.2
The U.S. government has considered carefully the proposal presented
to the Commission. We have consulted extensively with key domestic
stakeholders on this issue. In October 2012, it was the subject of a panel at
the annual meeting of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law (which includes academicians, practitioners, and
representatives of business interests).3 At that meeting, the proposal
made to UNCITRAL was not supported. The Executive Committee of the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC)—the organization that co-developed,
with the American Law Institute, the Uniform Commercial Code in the
United States—recently adopted a resolution stating that the ULC op* Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, Office of the Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The author is grateful for the assistance of
Harold Burman, Michael Dennis, and Timothy Schnabel, also of the Office of
Private International Law.
1. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Contract Law:
Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International
Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal].
2. A summary of the debate is contained in the Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, 45th Sess., June 25–July 6, 2012, ¶¶ 127–32, U.N. Doc. A/67/17;
GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2012) [hereinafter Report of 45th Session] (summarizing debate). Several delegations expressly objected to the ruling of the Chair
as not accurately reflecting the opinions voiced during the debate and—unusually—those objections were recorded in the official Report of the Commission.
3. The State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law
(ACPIL) holds a plenary meeting annually. See Private International Law, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, www.state.gov/s/l/c3452.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (providing information regarding ACPIL, including summary of October 11–12, 2012 annual
meeting).
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poses the proposal made in UNCITRAL because the project is very unlikely to be successful and because an attempt to develop the type of
instrument proposed would not be a prudent use of resources.4
On the basis of these consultations and other analysis, it is our view
that the time is not right for undertaking a global initiative. We reach this
conclusion because:
1. The need for an initiative of the scale proposed has not been
demonstrated (taking into account, inter alia, the availability of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(UNIDROIT Principles)5 and the ability of parties to designate those Principles as the law governing their contract).
2. We are not aware of demand for such a major initiative from U.S.
parties to international commercial contracts.
3. Even if the international legal system would be better if a broad
instrument of the sort advocated by the proponents were successfully
drafted and adopted, it is likely that the attempt to draft and adopt such
an instrument would expend considerable institutional resources of UNCITRAL and its member states, detracting from UNCITRAL’s continuing
efforts to achieve broader adoption of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), as well as other
projects of UNCITRAL. Moreover, we conclude that such an initiative
would have little chance of coming to a successful conclusion at this time.
A.

Need for a New Global Initiative?

Currently, the global harmonization and unification of international
commercial law relies primarily on two key international instruments: the
CISG6 and the UNIDROIT Principles.
With respect to the CISG, UNCITRAL is engaged in an ongoing effort
to promote the treaty’s worldwide ratification and uniform implementation. The CISG was the culmination of a half-century of work by the international community, including a decade of work in UNCITRAL. At the
2005 UNCITRAL Colloquium celebrating the 25th anniversary of the
CISG, the Convention was recognized as probably the single most successful treaty in the history of modern transactional commercial law.7 Since
that colloquium, fifteen more states have become party to the Convention,
4. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, MINUTES: MID-YEAR MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/executive/2013jan12_EC_Min_Midyear_Final.pdf.
5. See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), available at http://www.
unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
6. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncit
ral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
7. See Herbert Kronke, The UN Sales Convention, the UNIDROIT Contract Principles and the Way Beyond, 25 J.L. & COM. 451, 458–59 (2005).
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bringing the total number of states to seventy-eight.8 The success of the
Convention can be gauged by the fact that it has proved acceptable to
nations with different legal systems, varying levels of economic development, and diverse political systems. It is said that the CISG has become
the lingua franca of sales.9
As was discussed during the 2005 UNCITRAL Colloquium, the focus
of UNCITRAL in this area has been to promote global awareness of the
CISG and to facilitate uniform interpretation and application of its provisions.10 Pursuant to decisions by the Commission, including in 1998 and
2009, the UNCITRAL Secretariat is devoting resources to developing and
maintaining the CISG Digest and Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
(CLOUT) in the six official languages of the United Nations.11 The system relies on a network of national correspondents designated by those
states that are parties to the CISG and other instruments.12
The 2005 UNCITRAL Colloquium also highlighted the widespread
use of the UNIDROIT Principles as a complement to the CISG. In 2007
and 2012, UNCITRAL concluded that the 2005 and 2010 editions, respectively, of the Principles “complement a number of other instruments including the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (1980),” and further “commend[ed]” the use of the Principles as appropriate for their intended purposes, which are reflected in the
Principles’ Preamble:
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by them.
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria
or the like. . . . [And] when the parties have not chosen any law
to govern their contract.
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments. . . . [And] to interpret or supplement domestic law.
8. See Status 1980—United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (listing parties to
CISG).
9. See, e.g., Hiroo Sono, Contract Law Harmonization and Non-Contracting
States: The Case of the CISG 1 (July 9–12, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/congress/Sono_hiroo.pdf (providing text of presentation given
at UNCITRAL Congress Modern Law for Global Commerce).
10. See Jernej Sekolec, 25 Years UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Welcome Address, 25 J.L. & COM. xvii (2006), available at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sekolec.html.
11. See Report of 45th Session, supra note 2, ¶¶ 149–53, 157.
12. See id. ¶¶ 150–52.
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They may serve as a model for national and international
legislators.13
The UNCITRAL 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration14 and the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules15 specify that the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties as
applicable to the dispute. In this context, the term “rules of law” refers to
non-state law such as the UNIDROIT Principles. Moreover, there are contemporary international efforts to promote the availability and use of rules
of law. For example, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
is developing principles on choice of law in international commercial contracts, and those draft principles endorse giving effect to the choice of
parties to have their contract governed by “rules of law that are generally
accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral
and balanced set of rules.”16 That definition of rules of law includes the
UNIDROIT Principles, enabling parties who so desire to have their contracts governed by the UNIDROIT Principles.17
13. See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 5, at
pmbl. (providing 2010 Commission decision); Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, 40th Sess., June 25–July 12, 2007, ¶ 213, UN Doc. A/67/17 (Part I);
GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2007) (reporting 2007 Commission decision).
14. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 28 (1985) (as amended in 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html.
15. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 35(1) (2010) (as revised in 2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html.
16. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON
CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS art. 3 (2012), available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts2012principles_e.pdf. The Draft Hague
Principles were initially approved by the Special Commission on Choice of Law in
International Contracts held in The Hague on November 12–16, 2012. The Principles will be considered for final approval by the Council on General Affairs and
Policy (the Conference’s governing body).
17. Many institutional arbitration rules permit the tribunal to apply directly
the UNIDROIT Principles even in the absence of a choice of law. For example,
Article 21(1) of the ICC Rules provides “[t]he parties shall be free to agree upon
the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute.
In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of
law which it determines to be appropriate.” See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 21(1) (2012), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Prod
ucts-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/#
top; see also INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ARBITRATION RULES art. 28(1)
(2010), available at http://www.internationalarbitrationlaw.com/icdr-arbitrationrules/; LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, LCIA RULES art. 22(3) (1998), available at http://www.bu.edu/lawlibrary/PDFs/research/portals/pdfs/lcia_rules_
arbitration_english.pdf; AUSTL. CTR. FOR INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ACICA
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 34.1 (2005), available at http://www.acica.org.au/down
loads/ACICA_Arbitration_Rules.pdf; NETH. ARBITRATION INST., NAI ARBITRATION
RULES art. 46 (1998), available at http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=6&level
1=14433&level2=14445; STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SCC ARBITRATION
RULES 2010 art. 22(1) (2010), available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/
3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_v1_100927.pdf; VI-
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We do not think the case has been made that the current international framework is inhibiting trade or presents transactional problems to
such a degree that a major international negotiation—which assuredly
would be a difficult, lengthy exercise—is warranted. We have thus far not
heard requests for such an initiative from U.S. practitioners or their clients—those directly involved in international sales transactions. Moreover, there is a risk that a global undertaking to revise and expand the CISG
could have a chilling effect on further action by states to ratify or accede to
the 1980 instrument.
As discussed at the 2005 Colloquium, the CISG was never intended to
stand alone as a comprehensive framework: from the outset states envisioned that it would coexist with, and complement, other sources of law, as
well as with private self-regulation and party autonomy.18 More recently,
at the 2007 UNCITRAL Colloquium on Modern Law for Global Commerce it was observed that parties are increasingly selecting the CISG to
govern their international contracts.19 Initiating a new global initiative at
this point in time designed to change the CISG could slow that promising
trend.

ENNA INT’L ARBITRAL CTR., RULES OF ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION art. 22(2)
(2012), available at http://www.viac.org.vn/Uploads/Quy%20tac%202012%20Eng
%20-%20Final.PDF; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, & EXPERT DETERMINATION RULES & CLAUSES art. 59(a) (2009), available at
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/arbitration/446/wipo_pub_446.pdf.
On a regional level, the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts states in Article 9 that “[i]f the parties have not selected
the applicable law . . . . The Court . . . shall also take into account the general
principles of international commercial law recognized by international organizations.” Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Int’l Contracts art. 9,
Mar. 17, 1984, 33 I.L.M. 732. Article 10 further recognizes that “principles of international commercial law as well as commercial usage and practices generally accepted shall apply in order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity in
the particular case.” Id. art. 10. The references to general principles of international commercial law include the UNIDROIT Principles. On a domestic level,
Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 1-302, as revised in 2001, states that “parties may vary the
effect of [the Uniform Commercial Code’s] provisions by stating that their relationship will be governed by recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable to
commercial transactions . . . [such as] the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.” U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (2001).
18. See generally Filip De Ly, Sources of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model,
25 J.L. & COM. 1 (2005).
19. Several papers presented at the UNCITRAL Congress on Modern Law for
Global Commerce at the 40th Annual Session of UNCITRAL (Vienna, July 9–12,
2007) addressed the CISG’s increased use. See, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, Changing
the Opt-Out Tradition in the United States, (July 9–12, 2007), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Flechtner.pdf (providing text of presentation); Eckart Brödermann, The Practice of Excluding the CISG: Time for
Change? (July 9–12, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/con
gress/Broedermann-rev.pdf (same).
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Feasibility of a New Global Initiative?

It is also necessary to consider whether it is feasible to achieve the
ambitious goals that the proponents of the initiative have identified. If
this ambitious initiative were launched, what might be achieved?
It is not clear what the expected product of global negotiations might
be.20 The topics of contract law that have been proposed for such an initiative are already substantially covered in the UNIDROIT Principles.21
There would appear to be little value in having UNCITRAL duplicate
UNIDROIT’s work by developing a competing non-binding instrument.
Moreover, the proposal submitted to UNCITRAL characterizes the
UNIDROIT Principles’ status as a soft law instrument as being a perceived
shortcoming.22
The merits of a new global commercial code as either a soft law or a
hard law instrument were addressed at the UNCITRAL Colloquium celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the CISG. At that gathering, Professor
Herbert Kronke, then Secretary-General of UNIDROIT, reviewed what he
termed “the never-subsiding charm of codes” and concluded that the time
would be better spent on, inter alia, greater cooperation with respect to
existing instruments.23 He also emphasized the complementary nature
between the binding nature of the CISG and the non-binding nature of
the UNIDROIT Principles:
What we see looking at the two instruments—the CISG as the
mother of all modern conventions on the law of specific contracts and the UPICC as the (inevitably) soft-law source of modern general contract law—are neither competitors nor apples
and pears. What we see is actually, and even more, potentially, a
fruitful coexistence . . . . [T]he UNIDROIT Contract Principles
are, obviously, complementary in that they address a wide range
of topics of general contract law which neither the CISG nor any
20. See Swiss Proposal, supra note 1, at 7.
21. The proponents of a global initiative acknowledge that the UNIDROIT
Principles “now cover all areas that are perceived as contract law in most legal
systems.” Id. at 4.
22. See id. at 5. The Hague Conference on Private International Law has determined that a soft law approach—involving principles—is preferred in developing an instrument on choice of law in international commercial contracts. See
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, supra note 16.
23. See Kronke, supra note 7, at 462–63. Professor Kronke points out that
“While Professor Bonell is envisaging the [UNIDROIT Principles] assuming that
function in maintaining their present status of soft law, Professor Lando insists on
their being elevated to binding rules, to be mandatorily applied to non-domestic
and non-inter-European transactions.” Id. at 463; see also, Michael Joachim Bonell,
Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles? (July 9–12, 2007),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Bonell.pdf (providing
text of presentation).
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other existing or future convention devoted to a specific type of
transaction would ever venture to touch upon.24
The negotiations relating to the CISG demonstrate the difficulty of
the task. The drafters were confronted with widely different legal traditions as well as different approaches to international business transactions
and different policy approaches between developing and industrialized
countries. Topics such as validity, including mistake, and agency were left
out of the CISG because they were not at that time considered suitable for
harmonization.25 Though a few states may have done so, we are not aware
of, in the years since those negotiations, states reaching a broad consensus
on the many very challenging issues deliberately left out of the CISG or
insufficiently addressed by the CISG, or that such a consensus is likely to
be found in a new global negotiation.
24. Kronke, supra note 7, at 458–59. Professor Kronke continues with an example concerning the concept of good faith:
While it is true that governments would be well-advised not to again discuss, for example, the concept of good faith in the context of developing
rules for a specific transaction, as they did in Vienna where they finally
settled on papering over disagreements in Article 7 CISG, we can say so
only now that we have discovered an alternative vehicle for the promotion of that concept: Article 1.7 UNIDROIT Contract Principles.
Id. at 459.
25. For example, issues of substantive validity were generally excluded from
the scope of the CISG pursuant to Article 4, based primarily on a Secretariat report
finding that: (1) these issues rarely arise, and that there was no indication that
differences in the laws with respect to contract validity lead to significant problems
in international trade; and (2) “rules on duress, or similar rules on usury, unconscionable contracts, good faith in performance and the like also serve as a vehicle
by which the political, social and economic philosophy of the society is made effective in respect of contracts” and
[i]t is by the extensive or the restrictive interpretation of such rules that
many legal systems have effected the balance between a philosophy of
sanctity of contract with the security of transactions which that affords
and a philosophy of protecting the weaker party to a transaction at the
cost of rendering contracts less secure.
U.N. Secretary-General, Formation and Validity of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128, annex. II, reprinted in [1977] VIII Y.B. UNCITRAL 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977. States subsequently decided to exclude specific rules on validity with regard to mistake because of their inconsistent
treatment under various legal systems. See Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Ninth Session, Sept. 19–30, 1977, ¶¶ 48–69, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/142, reprinted in [1978] IX Y.B. UNCITRAL 65–66, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.0/SER.A/1978 (decision to exclude specific rules on validity, particularly with
regard to mistake). Similarly, efforts to address issues related to agency were not
successful. See, e.g., Rep. of the Working Group on the Work of Its Sixth Session,
Jan. 27–Feb. 7, 1975, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100, reprinted in [1975] VI Y.B. UNCITRAL 53 (“There was opposition to a special article on agency relationships in a
convention on sales and no consensus was reached on the adoption of this proposal. At the same time it was agreed to delete any reference to agency relationship
in other articles of the Convention.”). UNIDROIT subsequently developed a Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, but only a few countries
have ratified it and it has never entered into force. See Convention on Agency in
the Int’l Sale of Goods, Feb. 17, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 249.
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The drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles was achievable for a number of reasons, as pointed out by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, one of the
key contributors to the development of the Principles:
[D]o we not tremble when we meet at the thought of drafting
principles for the entire world? . . . . We do not tremble for at
least four reasons. One, we are drafting mere principles and not
a uniform law, so that whatever rules we write are only likely to be
applied if they find favor with someone concerned with a particular transaction or dispute. . . . Two, most of our principles are
unlikely to miscarry because they are framed with evident generality (e.g., “good faith and fair dealing”) or they have built-in
safety valves (e.g., “unless the circumstances indicate otherwise”),
giving them enough flexibility to permit a judge or arbitrator to
use common sense in applying them so as to avoid an arbitrary or
unfair result. Three, in some instances we have declined to deal
with tough questions, as in the area . . . of invalidity on a variety
of grounds under the applicable domestic law. And four, . . .
UNIDROIT is free to amend the Principles . . . from time to time
to take care of problems that later surface.26
Moreover, the negotiations were largely conducted by experts who
were not representing governments bound by national policies but rather
participated in their individual capacities, thereby enjoying more flexibility in developing the Principles.27 Even so, the negotiations in
UNIDROIT regarding the first version of the Principles took fourteen
years.
In UNCITRAL, the dynamic would be far different—governments
would conduct the negotiations with more direct implications for national
interests, and policy positions that must be defended. As a result, reaching
consensus would inevitably be more difficult. As Professor Peter Schlechtriem observed with regard to the CISG:
No codification is ever perfect, and every legal text, therefore
needs instruments and concepts that allow adjustments, development and gap-filling to cope with issues not foreseen by its drafters. This is even more so in the case of codifications based on
international conventions, for, while a domestic legislator might
26. E. Allan Farnsworth, Closing Remarks, Contract Law in a Changing World, 40
AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 699–700 (1992).
27. See Roy Goode, Rule, Practice, and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial
Law, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 539, 553–54, 556 (2005) (stating that Principles
demonstrate “that the formulation of international rules of general law, whether
relating to international trade or otherwise, is best left to scholars,” who have
“technical expertise and freedom from political restraints,” while governments can
“focus on more specific areas—for example, competition law and consumer protection—where the rules are essentially mandatory rules or rules of public policy
rather than dispositive provisions.”); see also Bonell, supra note 23.
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be willing and competent to enact necessary improvements and
reforms, the chances that another United Nations conference
can be convened on the CISG, that it will reach results, and that
all states that have enacted the Convention will also enact reforms, is almost zero. So there must be safety valves. They are
interpretation and gap-filling. The basis is article 7 of the CISG,
the formulation of which can now be found in a number of other
international conventions, model laws and drafts.28
With regard to the discussion of codifying international commercial
law, it has been suggested that the experience of the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) may be instructive.29 Yet the United
States has never attempted a comprehensive codification of the law governing the sale of goods. Rather, Article 2 of the U.C.C., while codifying
many important rules in a systematic way, still relies heavily on general
principles of law outside the U.C.C.—which were not the subject of harmonization efforts—to fill its many gaps. Examples include agency; what
constitutes an offer to enter into a contract; and the circumstances in
which a contract might be avoided on grounds such as mistake, misrepresentation, duress, and illegality. The experience in the United States suggests that certain aspects of contract law are not good candidates for
codification. In the 1990s, the American Law Institute and the Uniform
Law Commission considered revising Article 2 to cover certain service contracts related to contracts for the sale of goods (i.e., contracts to install,
maintain, support, and repair goods). Although drafts were prepared and
considered, the effort was quickly abandoned as not feasible.
The difficulties encountered in trying to codify these issues within
one common law country suggest that trying to do so internationally—
across common law and civil law jurisdictions—would be quite challenging. Within the United States, these topics have been dealt with through
approaches such as the Restatement of Contracts, which can address the
issues as principles rather than seeking codification as in the U.C.C. Similarly, the limited approach taken with regard to the CISG left these topics
to be dealt with internationally in soft law instruments such as the
UNIDROIT Principles.30
28. Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of
the CISG, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 781, 789 (2005).
29. See, e.g., CLIVE M. SCHMITTOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC
CLIMATE 30 (2d ed. 1981) (“[The] attempt to draft a world code on international
trade law . . . is not an idle dream. . . . [T]here is the example of the Uniform
Commercial Code of the United States. It started as an academic venture but became reality when it was adopted by 49 of the 50 jurisdictions of the United
States.”); see also Michael Joachim Bonell, Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106
DICK. L. REV. 87, 89 (2001).
30. Just as the U.S. has had difficulty in developing a comprehensive code of
contract law domestically, the European Union has, in the course of considering a
series of initiatives, experienced similar problems with the development of a set of
uniform regional principles.
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In short, the historical example of the CISG speaks for itself. Those
negotiations, building on forty years of work in the international arena in
other organizations, still took nearly ten years—and elected not to tackle
some of the hardest issues.
II. MAXIMIZING PRODUCTIVE USE

OF

UNCITRAL’S RESOURCES

What, then, might UNCITRAL productively do in the area of international contract law? It is important to recognize that in fact UNCITRAL is
already doing a good deal in that regard in line with its primary mandate
to promote coordination and cooperation in the development of international trade law:31
• encouraging more widespread ratification of or accession to the
CISG;32
• developing and maintaining the CISG Digest (now third edition)
and CLOUT in the six official languages of the United Nations,
thereby promoting the uniform interpretation and application of
the CISG;33
• endorsing the UNIDROIT Principles as complementary to the
CISG, including most recently the 2010 edition;34 and
• endorsing the ICC’s Incoterms, including most recently the 2010
edition.35
Other UNCITRAL activities could be explored, keeping in mind the
factors previously noted: demonstration of need and feasibility; scarcity of
resources and competing priorities; and the value of collaboration with
other organizations. For example, UNIDROIT is developing model
clauses to be used by parties to ensure that the UNIDROIT Principles will
govern their contracts.36 When that project is complete, UNCITRAL may
consider whether to endorse them.
31. Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/
6594 (Dec. 17, 1966); see also Gerold Herrmann, The Role of UNCITRAL, in FOUNDATIONS & PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 28, 34 (Ian Fletcher, Loukas
Mistelis & Marise Cremona eds., 2001).
32. See Report of 45th Session, supra note 2, ¶¶ 159–60.
33. See id. ¶¶ 149–53.
34. See id. ¶¶ 137–40.
35. See id. ¶¶ 141–44. For a comprehensive list of texts of other organizations
endorsed by UNCITRAL, see Texts of Other Organizations Endorsed by UNCITRAL,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/other_organizations_texts.
html (last visited on Apr. 4, 2013).
36. The UNIDROIT Governing Council, at its 91st session in May 2012, decided to set up a restricted Working Group for the preparation of Model Clauses
for use by parties intending to indicate in their contract more precisely in what way
they wish to see the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
used during the performance of the contract or when a dispute arises. The Working Group, composed of experts in the field of private international law and arbitration, held its first session in Rome February 11–12, 2013. See Model Clauses for
Use by Parties of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
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The United States has long been a strong supporter of UNCITRAL.
We consider UNCITRAL a real success story—one of the most practical
and productive organs in the UN system. It creates tangible legal products
that can have a real impact in promoting international trade, while at the
same time contributing to the rule of law globally. This record of achievement continues under the very capable leadership of Secretary Sorieul.
Yet UNCITRAL, like other elements of the United Nations, is under increasing budget pressures, as are member and observer states, including
developing countries.37 Thus, it is important that UNCITRAL marshal its
resources and be selective in its choice of projects.
One must also take into account competing priorities. With regard to
possible new projects, the Commission has expressly assigned priority to
another topic, which has broad support particularly among developing
countries: microfinance and other means of creating an enabling legal
environment for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.38 UNCITRAL held a colloquium on that topic January 16–18, 2013 in Vienna.
The Commission also endorsed exploratory work in the area of publicprivate partnerships and project finance.39 UNCITRAL will hold a colloquium on those issues in May 2013. With the ongoing work in several
working groups, UNCITRAL’s resources are already spread thin.
Also, the Commission has in the past recognized that the Secretariat
can face resource shortfalls with regard to efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the CISG.40 As Gerold Herrmann, then Secretary of UNCITRAL, observed a decade ago regarding such efforts:
[T]he Secretariat’s lack of resources is a particularly disappointing feature here . . . [because] the preparation of a uniform
law is an extremely expensive affair (the Sales Convention cost
the United Nations alone an estimated 6 million U.S. dollars)
which would mean a considerable waste if, for lack of a comparatively minute amount, the text will not be made known to the
relevant people.41
UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/modelclauses/main.
htm (last updated Mar. 26, 2013).
37. In 2011, the United States and other UNCITRAL members had to mobilize to protect UNCITRAL’s budget from proposed cuts that would have ended the
traditional practice of alternating UNCITRAL meetings between Vienna and New
York, a practice that the United States and other UNCITRAL members consider
highly important to maintaining the diversity of representation at its meetings, the
quality of UNCITRAL’s work, and the global impact of its instruments. Those
funds were ultimately restored, but only after extensive discussions. See Rep. of the
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 44th Sess., June 27–July 8, 2011, ¶¶ 334–44,
U.N. Doc. A/66/17; GAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2011).
38. See id. ¶¶ 124–26.
39. See id. ¶¶ 115–23.
40. See Report of 45th Session, supra note 2, ¶ 157.
41. Herrmann, supra note 31, at 33.
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Such efforts are equally important today.
III. CONCLUSION
Achieving further harmonization and unification of international
contract law is a worthy goal. However, we must be pragmatic. Key domestic constituencies and trusted advisers tell us that the time is not right for a
global initiative, principally because the desired results simply cannot be
achieved at this time. If such a major undertaking were to be pursued at
the present time, we envisage a contentious, multi-year negotiation that
would likely not bring significant results, and at great expense to UNCITRAL and its members. There is also the risk that it could detract from
existing efforts to secure widespread adoption of the CISG. The U.S. government believes that there are less ambitious but more practical alternatives for achieving progress in this area, and that UNCITRAL should
continue to focus on such alternatives.
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